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A PLEA FOR A STATUTE.
The well-known tendency of the lawyer engaged in the
drafting of conveyances is to adhere as closely as possible to
the beaten paths; to follow the forms handed down from the
fathers; to view with suspicion and close scrutiny any departure
therefrom, and to insert new clauses and covenants only when
convinced that they are demanded by the necessities engendered
by tonditions and enterprises unknown to a former day.
It is comparatively rare, however, to see him look upon this
beaten path and doubt; to take up one of the time-honored
forms and pause; to study a rule of law propounded in the
reign of Edward II., and in drawing an instrument with the
intention of avoiding the operation of that rule, to feel that the
use of one synonym instead of another will result in the
enforcement of the rule and the defeat of his purpose.
Yet this is the situation to-day of the Pennsylvania lawyer
who has been employed to draw a deed or will creating an
estate for life in the first taker with remainder to his issue,
offspring, heirs or children. The advice may be given him to
stop, look, and ponder, for the beaten path is treacherous.
The case of Grimes v. Shirk, 169 Pa. St. 74 (May 20,
x895), is the latest thus far officially reported touching the
Rule in Shelley's Case. It was an appeal from the Common
Pleas of Lancaster County, and the judgment was affirmed by
the Supreme Court upon what was justly pronounced "the able
and exhaustive opinion" of the court beiow, Livingston, P. J.
The ruling was upon the proper construction to be given to
the following clause in a will:
"I give and devise to my adopted daughter Hester .... all that
certain messuage. . . . for and during the term of her natural life. And
after the death of my said adopted daughter, I give and devise the reversion
or remainder of the real estate herein devised to her, to her lawful issue,
to have and to hold the same to them, their heirs and assigns forever, And
in case the said Hester should die without leaving lawful issue, then the
aforesaid real estate shall revert to my estate, and I give and devise the
same to my heirs under the intestate laws."
Held, that Hester took an estate in fee in the land devised to her.
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There should have been nothing surprising in this ruling
except, perhaps, to the lawyer who drew the will and thought
that he was effectuating the intention of the testator. The
Rule in Shelley's Case has been a landmark of real estate law
for centuries, and the court followed a host of authorities in
holding that this devise was within the rule. Another case
involving the same point (Heister v. Yerger, 166 Pa. St. 445)
had been decided four months earlier in the same way, though
the opinion was not so full. That was the case of a devise to
a nephew for life and after his decease, to his then surviving
heirs in fee simple. Held, that the nephew took a fee simple
estate in the land.
Just here arises the difficulty and commences, in the language
of Judge Brewster, (III Practice, Sec. 3940) "such a clashing of
authority as tends to perplex and bewilder the practitioner"-
"an evil unquestionably serious ". The question is, as above
stated, how is an instrument to be drawn under the Pennsylvania
authorities which will vest a life estate in the first taker with
remainder to his heirs, with the same degree of certainty as is
incident to an ordinary conveyance to a grantee in fee?
There ought to be some way of effecting it. It is not
intricate or complex; on the contrary, it is one of the first
modes of disposing of an estate that suggests itself to a testator.
I assert, nevertheless, that without legislative intervention it
cannot be done upon any other foundation than the hope that
the Supreme Court will follow a certain line of its own decisions
rather than another.
In 1876, Mr. Joseph P. Gross, of the Philadelphia Bar,
prepared a set of nine " Tabular Statements of the Decisions
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upon the Rule in
Shelley's Case," of which five hundred copies were printed for
the use of the State Senate. It evinces a careful examination
of the authorities and affords proof by diagrams of the confusion
referred to; one table containing a summary of the special
features in each case where certain words received one con-
struction, and the succeedinj table containing the cases giving
the same words precisely the opposite construction; and so on,
throughout the tables.
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There are to be found in our Supreme Court Reports more
than one hundred cases involving the Rule in Shelley's Case.
They may be classified as follows, it being understood, of
course, that words of limitation carry the fee to the first
taker, those of purchase giving him only a life estate and
preserving the remainder:
Limitation. Purchase.
Heirs ..... .................. ... 21 6
Heirs of the Body ............... ..... 6 2
Issue* * ........ .................. 12 16
Children .................... .... 7 27
Offspring ...... ................. I
Words equivalent to Heirs .... ......... I
Upon an account stated of the foregoing figures, it would
seem that the word " Children " is the only one that can be
safely employed for the end in view. This conclusion is
strengthened by the fact that the six decisions of the Supreme
Court since 1887, construing this word, have held it a word
of purchase, although in that year the same court, in Mason v.
Ainmn, 117 Pa. 127, held a devise to a sister" and at her
death to her child, children or other lineal descendants," to
vest a fee-tail, converted b.y the statute into a fee-simple, in the
first taker, the latter words qualifying the words "child or
children" and making them words of limitation.
In more than one of the latter cases, such as Keims Appeal,
125 Pa. 480 (1889), reference is made to Cote v. Von
BonnhOrst, 41 Pa. 243 (1861), where the court say: "We
spend no time in showing that, under a devise to one for life
with a remainder to his or her children, the first taker has no
freehold of inheritance. That such is the general rule is
beyond doubt." Yet, in Haldeman v. Haldeman, 40 Pa.
29 (1861), the Supreme Court, speaking by the same judge
(Strong), held a devise to three daughters, executors to pay
them the rents and income during their lives, and at their
deaths the estate "to descend and go to the child, and if
dcildren, share and share alike, and in default of issue," then
over, to be an estate tail converted into a fee.
And, in McKee v. McKinley, 33 Pa. 92 (1859), the court
* The sixteen cases construing the word "Issue," it will be remembered, have now
been overruledby Grimes v. Shirk (ubra).
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held a devise to a daughter for her sole use "revertible" after
her death to her children, and in case of no children or issue of
children, then over, to vest a fee simple in the daughter.
(It ought, perhaps, to be noted that the report of this case
states that "Strong, J., was absent at Nisi Pr'us.")
These cases followed Stewart v. Kenover, 7 W. & S., 288
(1844); Williams v. Leech, 28 Pa. 89 (1856), and Naglee's
Appeal, 33 Pa. 89 (859), but still we are told, in Cote v.
Von Bonnhorst, that the doctrine stated is the general rule and
beyond doubt. Attention may, therefore, well be called here
to the case of Oyster v. Knull, 137 Pa. 448 (189o), where the
court below, Simonton, J., had construed the word "children"
as equivalent to "heirs." While the Supreme Court reversed
this construction, it remarked (p. 453): "It cannot be said
that the construction we have adopted is entirely free from
doubt."
And it cannot be said that this doubt has been lessened by
the recently reported case of Ralston v. Truesdell, 178 Pa. 430.
In that case the language of testator was:
"I leave and bequeath unto my granddaughter N. all the real property
that my wife enjoys during her life, and at my wife's death I bequeath
the same property that she held during her life to N. and the heirs of her
body; but if she should die and leave no child or children, then in such
a case the said property shall be sold to the best advantage and equally
divided among my other legatees and their heirs."
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court
below on the opinion of McIlvaine, P. J., holding that the
words " heirs of the body " created an estate tail in N., which
the words "child or children" did not affect; that although
this estate was enlarged by the statute into a fee-simple, the
other legatees and their heirs took an executory estate in fee;
that N. dying leaving no children, the estate tail (though now
a fee simple) was to be abridged by the happening of that
contingency and the estate in fee vested in the "other lega-
tees and their heirs; " but, finally, that N., having executed a
deed under the act of Jan. 16, 1799, to bar the entail (the
grantee immediately reconveying the property to her) also by
such deed barred the executory devise to the "other legatees"
of the testator.
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Lack of space forbids further elaboration of detailed cases,
but it will be well to note, at this point, the fact that nearly all
the decisions upon the subject have been upon cases where
the title has been claimed or attacked through a will and an
effort made to arrive at the intention of the testator. Now, it
is recognized law that a distinction exists in point of strictness
between the construction of wills and that of deeds, the latter
being presumed to have been made "with forethought and
care." We are forced to wonder how, under the Pennsylvania
decisions, a greater degree of care can be employed than that
shown to be necessary in the preparation of an instrument
always construed with indulgence.
Judge Brewster (III Practice, p. ioi), in Section 3953, entitled
"To avoid defeat of testator's intention," recommends the
avoidance of the words " heir" or " heirs " unless the heir is
named; and also the avoidance of the words " heirs of his
"body," "issue" and "children," unless the cases classified by
him under the heads "Issue, a Word of Purchase" and
"Children, a Word of Purchase," are closely followed. But if
certain children are mentioned by name, will the estate open
and let in those subseqdently born and not named? If not,
the intent of a testator who desires all to share alike will
certainly be defeated.
It has been suggested that the employment of trustees for
the use of the life tenant and, at his death, to pay over the
estate to the remaindermen might, in some way, affect the situa-
tion and effectuate the devisor's or grantor's intent. But the
Supreme Court has repeatedly ignored that medium and
recognized a fee simple in the equitable life tenant. The
leading case on this point is that of Ogden's Appeal, 7o Pa.
5o (1872), cited approvingly in Grimes v. Shirk (supra).
The conclusion of the whole matter, it is again submitted, is
that, in the present condition of the decisions, there can be no
absolute certainty without legislative intervention. Such inter-
vention has been obtained in New York, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Mississippi, Virginia, Kentucky,
Ohio (as to wills), Maine, Michigan, Tennessee, Wisconsin,
Minnesota, Missouri, Alabama, and New Hampshire (as to
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wills). Why can not we have a statute by which a distinct
line of demarcation will be drawn and instruments for these
purposes lifted out of the "seeming clear" and the conjectural
"if there be enough on the face of the will," and placed finally
upon a foundation which will make it unnecessary for our
courts to say, as the Supreme Court very properly said in
Heister v. Yerger (supra), "We must apply the rule governing
cases of this kind, although by so doing we defeat the
particular intent of the testator ?"
The following is suggested as a form of such a statute:
".Be it en cted, etc., that where any estate in real property is given by
deed or will to any person for his life, and after his death to his heirs or
the heirs of his body, issue, children or offspring, by whatever words of
equivalent import they may be designated, the conveyance or will shall
be construed to vest an estate for life only in such person and a remainder
in fee simple in his heirs, the heirs of his body, issue, children or
offspring."
(NoTZ.-As is pointed out in II. Minor's Institutes (Virginia), p. 405,
this form would not toll the effect of the rule where any estate of freehold
other than an estate for the life of the ancestor is first granted-e. g., an
estate for the life of another. Instances of this kind are, however, rare,
and for conveyancing purposes it is believed that the above would suffice.)
Pennsylvania may safely be pronounced a most conservative
state in regard to the adoption of amendments to her established
laws. Indeed, she may be said to carry this conservatism at
times to a perilous extreme. A rule of law may be gray with
age and therefore venerable; but it may also be gray with
mildew and absurd, to describe it by no harsher term. Only
in 1855 was the Statute of Frauds, in the form that had obtained
since 29 Car. II in England, and for decades prior to 1855 in
most of the:American states, completed in this state. Only in
the same year was passed the act abolishing estates-tail. Only
in 1874 was a constitution adopted which prohibited local or
special legislation-an evil, which, had it continued much
longer, must have resulted in the necessity of legal specialists
for each county. And not yet has a uniform Practice Act
been provided to take the place of the differing rules of court
of the fifty-four judicial districts of the state.
No serious opposition to a inovement for this advance in our
real estate law should be anticipated. As soon as its merits
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are explained to the layman they will be acknowledged by
him; for one of the anomalies which he holds in greatest
dread is a legal instrument which says one thing and means
another-the reason of the difference being in this case simply
impossible of explanation to him.
Will not one of the lawyer-members of the General Assem-
bly, now in session, take up this matter and by securing the-
enactment of a statute similar to that suggested put an end to,
the "perplexity and bewilderment" of the practitioner and earn
the thanks of all who 'believe in a quiet title?
George Bryan.
Tifumilk, JP4., APril 45, 'r897.
